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INTRODUCTION 
 California Evidence Code section 1108 allows prosecutors to 
bring in evidence of the defendant’s past sexual misconduct, alleged 
and otherwise, when they are currently on trial for a sex crime.1  As 
such, section 1108 functions as a loophole to the California Evidence 
Code rules against character evidence, reflecting how sex crimes are 
treated differently than other offenses.  
 This Comment will examine whether section 1108 potentiates 
miscarriages of justice.  I will begin with a general discussion of 
character evidence and the justifications for its general prohibition in 
California’s criminal courts.  I will discuss the sexual offense exception 
to the rules against character evidence, including whether it is ethical or 
even relevant to allow evidence of criminal sexual misconduct in the 
prosecutor’s case-in-chief.  Using a feminist lens, I will compare and 
contrast section 1108 to other special sex crime evidence provisions, 
such as California Evidence Code sections 1103 and 752, colloquially 
knows as rape shield laws.  Looking to the science and mythology of 
sex crime propensity, I will examine whether section 1108 is actually 
the right solution to prevent serial offenders from offending again, and 
I will end with suggestions to narrow the breadth of section 1108 to 
prevent due process violations in its utilization.  
DEFINING CHARACTER EVIDENCE 
  According to California Evidence Code section 1101, character 
evidence is not admissible in a California criminal jury trial to show 
that a person acted in accordance with his or her character on a 
particular occasion.2  Beyond the California Evidence Code’s 
boilerplate,3 it is hard to actually pin down what character evidence is 
because the definition of the word “character” is nebulous:  
A survey of cases dealing with character evidence shows that 
courts often attempt their own definitions.  Some court-created 
definitions of character include ‘[a] fixed disposition or tendency’   . . . 
the ‘disposition or propensity to commit certain crimes, wrongs or 
acts’; and ‘a person's tendency to act in a certain way in all varying 
situations of life,’ among others.  At best, these definitions are too 
1. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108 (West 2016).
2. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101(a) (West 2016): Except as provided in this section and in
Sections 1102, 1103, 1108, and 1109, evidence of a person's character or a trait of his or her 
character (whether in the form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific 
instances of his or her conduct) is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on 
a specified occasion. 
3. Id.
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general, confusing, and vague.  They do not distinguish, for example, 
between a character trait on one hand, and a person's habit, mental 
disorder, or sexuality on the other.4   
WHY IS CHARACTER EVIDENCE GENERALLY EXCLUDED? 
There are two primary reasons for the rule against character 
evidence.5  First, the notion of character as predictive of actual 
behavior is actually a kind of mythology.6  According to Professor 
Mark Cammack, “while we typically use the notion of character for 
organizing our perceptions of other people, generalizations about 
character do not correlate as strongly with actual behavior as is 
generally believed.”7  Professor Cammack further describes the 
conundrum as follows: “[t]he problem is not one of logical relevance, 
since evidence of a person’s generalized disposition has some 
probative value on the issue of whether she behaved consistently with 
that disposition.”8  Rather, the problematic aspect of character evidence 
is its resulting prejudice.9   
Jurors can overestimate the importance and predictive value of 
character evidence, and subsequently give it more weight and 
persuasive value than is merited.10  In the words of former Supreme 
Court Justice Robert H. Jackson, “The inquiry is not rejected because 
character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too much 
with the jury and to so over persuade them as to prejudge one with a 
bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a 
particular charge.”11  Justice Jackson further asserts that “[t]he 
overriding policy of excluding such evidence, despite its admitted 
probative value, is the practical experience that its disallowance tends 
to prevent confusion of issues, unfair surprise and undue prejudice.”12 
The second main tenant in the prohibition against character 
evidence of prior bad acts highlights the risk of jury misuse.13  There is 
substantial concern that jurors may use evidence of character to decide 
4. Barrett J. Anderson, Note, Recognizing Character: A New Perspective on
Character Evidence, 121 YALE L.J. 1912, 1922 (2012).  
5. Mark Cammack, Using the Doctrine of Chances to Prove Actus Reus in Child






10. Cammack, supra note 5.
11. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475–76 (1948).
12. Id. at 476.
13. Anderson, supra note 4, at 1929–930.
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whether a person should be convicted and punished, rather than base 
their decision of the culpability of that person on the act that 
precipitated the trial.14  As the backbone of our legal system is the 
notion of guilt based on conduct rather than personal qualities or 
attributes, the idea that guilt rests on the juror’s valuing of the character 
of the person on trial is clearly improper.15 
In attorney Celia McGuiness’ article for UC Hastings Law 
Review, she describes her personal experiences with the dangers of 
character evidence:  
[I]t distracts the jury from judging the real, physical, direct and
circumstantial evidence of a crime, and instead leads to a judgment
of the defendant himself.  In my practice, I have seen that jurors'
verdicts may, consciously or subconsciously, turn on whether or
not they liked the defendant.  Jurors may acquit, not from an overt
desire to excuse someone they like, but rather from the natural
inclination to be more skeptical of evidence against a person whom
they consider worthy of protection.  In the minds of jurors, the legal
presumptions of innocence and the burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt are often construed more strictly in favor of a
person who is considered a good person, or at least, not a bad one.16
 For the aforementioned reasons, under California Evidence 
Code section 1101, character evidence is not admissible in the 
prosecutor’s case-in-chief to show propensity.  However, since the 
1995 passage of California Evidence Code section 1108, character 
evidence is admissible as evidence of propensity when prosecuting sex 
crimes.17  
BACKGROUND OF THE SECTION 1108 EXCEPTION 
In 1995, the California State Legislature enacted Evidence Code 
section 1108.  As the California Supreme Court purports, “evidence of 
a defendant's other sex offenses constitutes relevant circumstantial 
evidence that he committed the charged sex offenses.”18  Under 
California Evidence Code section 1108, in a sex crimes trial the 
prosecutor is permitted to introduce evidence that the defendant has 
committed other sex crimes in the past.19  There is virtually no limit on 
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Celia McGuinness, Sliding Backwards: The Impact of California Evidence Code
Section 1108 on Character Evidence, Rape Shield Laws and the Presumption of Innocence, 
9 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 97, 100 (1998). 
17. Id. at 102.
18. People v. Falsetta, 21 Cal. 4th 903, 920 (1999).
19. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108(a) (West 2016): In a criminal action in which the
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the nature of the previous act which may be used.20  The defendant 
need not have actually been convicted or even arrested of a past sex 
crime; instead, the prosecutor can introduce evidence that he was 
merely arrested in a case where charges were dropped, or that he 
committed a sex crime for which charges were never filed.21  An 
allegation is enough.22  Even gossip, in the form of reputation or 
opinion, may be sufficient.23  Perhaps most critically, past acts need not 
be similar to the charged offense as long as they are under the same 
proscribed umbrella of sexual misconduct.24
Further, section 1108 differs from all other rules regarding 
character evidence because it allows the introduction of the evidence in 
the prosecution’s case in chief; the door for admissibility does not need 
to be first opened by the defendant’s introduction of his good 
character.25  The Assembly Digest of the bill states that “evidence 
admitted under this new section would be subject to rational 
assessment by a jury as evidence of the defendant’s disposition to 
commit such crimes, and as evidence concerning the probability or 
improbability that the defendant has been falsely or mistakenly 
implicated in the commission of charged offense.”26  The author of the 
bill, Senator James Rogan (R-Glendale), explains his motivation for the 
development of section 1108: 
Under current law, evidence that a particular defendant has 
committed rape, acts of child molestation, or other sexual offense 
against other victims is not necessarily admissible in a trial where 
the defendant is being accused of a subsequent sexual offense. The 
propensity to commit sexual offenses is not a common attribute 
among the general public. Therefore, evidence that a particular 
defendant has such a propensity is especially probative and should 
be considered by [the trier] of fact when determining the credibility 
of a victim’s testimony. This proposal will amend the Evidence 
Code so as to establish, in sexual offense actions, a presumption of 
admissibility for evidence that the defendant has committed similar 
defendant is accused of a sexual offense, evidence of the defendant's commission of another 
sexual offense or offenses is not made inadmissible by Section 1101, if the evidence is not 
inadmissible pursuant to Section 352. 
20. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108 (West 2016).
21. Id.
22. See id.
23. McGuinness, supra note 16, at 104.
24. See id. at 105.
25. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108 (West 2016).
26. CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST, A.B. 882, 1995-96 Reg. Sess., (Cal.
1995).  
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crimes on other occasions.27 
Additionally, as with all evidence introduced in California 
criminal trials, character evidence regarding past sex crimes may be 
excluded under California Evidence Code section 352 if its value is 
substantially outweighed by either the probability that it would take too 
much time to present, or the risk that it would either cause undue 
prejudice against the defendant, confuse the issues, or mislead the 
jury.28  The court has the discretion to decide whether or not to exclude 
sex crimes character evidence for one of these reasons.29 
California Evidence Code section 1108 specifically makes twenty-
one offenses admissible,30 including pornography distribution offenses, 
as well as violent acts.31  Eight of the offenses require no actual 
physical contact.32  The Code allows the admission of such proclivities 
as sadomaschochism, permitting evidence of acts "[d]eriving sexual 
pleasure or gratification from the infliction of death, bodily injury, or 
physical pain on another person.”33  Section 1108 broadly ends with a 
catch-all provision for "[a]n attempt or conspiracy to engage in conduct 
described in this paragraph.”34  
DUE PROCESS DILEMMA 
In People v. Falsetta, the California Supreme court unanimously 
held that the section 1108 exception to the ban on character evidence 
does not violate the Due Process Clause of the federal Constitution.35  
However, this conclusion contradicts the fundamental notions of due 
process that motivated the exclusion of character evidence in the first 
place,36 such as a right to a fair trial.37  Convictions based on a jury’s 
perception, enabled by section 1108, that the defendant is a bad 
27. McGuinness, supra note 16, at 103–04.
28. Id.; see also CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 2016): The court in its discretion may
exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its 
admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of 
undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury. 
29. Id.
30. CAL. EVID. CODE § l108 (West 2016); see also McGuinness, supra note 16, at 104.
31. CAL. EVID. CODE § l108 (d)(1)(A) (West 2016) (referring to, inter alia, conduct
prohibited by CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.2(b) (West 2016)); see also McGuinness, supra note 
16, at 104. 
32. CAL. EVID. CODE § l108 (d)(1)(A) (West 2016); see also McGuinness, supra note
16, at 104.   
33. CAL. EVID. CODE § l108(d)(1)(E) (West 2016); see also McGuinness, supra note
16, at 104–05.  
34. CAL. EVID. CODE § l108(d)(1)(F) (West 2016).
35. People v, Falsetta, 21 Cal. 4th 903, 907, 915–22 (1999).
36. See Michelson v. U.S., 335 U.S. 469, 475–76 (1948).
37. See McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d 1378, 1384 (9th Cir. 1993).
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character sabotages the presumption of innocence and lessens the 
state’s burden of proof.38  Facts should supersede speculation, 
prejudice, and fear in criminal trials.39   
 Since the constitutionality of section 1108 under the Due 
Process Clause is facially problematic, one would think that the United 
States Supreme Court would address such policies head-on.  However, 
in Spencer v. Texas, regarding a Texas state habitual offender law 
similar to section 1108, the Court held that utilizing prior convictions 
does not offend the principles of due process.40  Even though the 
United States Supreme Court expressed doubt regarding the scope of 
the habitual offender law contested in Spencer,41 “it cited its traditional 
hesitance to dictate rules of criminal procedure to the states as a reason 
to refrain from finding that the Texas statutes violated due process.”42  
According to Justice Benjamin Cardozo,43 “a state rule of law ‘does not 
run foul of the Fourteenth Amendment because another method may 
seem to our thinking to be fairer or wiser or to give a surer promise of 
protection to the prisoner at bar.’”44  However, in Spencer, the evidence 
of prior specific acts was admitted as proof of recidivism to prove the 
defendant was a habitual offender, which, unlike character evidence, is 
a standard method of evaluating defendants and is not limited to sex 
offenders.45  Further, the court in Spencer considered prior convictions, 
not the allegations or even gossip that can be admitted under section 
1108 to prove uncharged prior bad acts.46 
 Although Spencer was decided decades before California’s 
legislature passed section 1108, in his dissent and concurrence in 
Spencer, Chief Justice Earl Warren points out issues directly relevant 
to the code’s constitutionality: “Recidivist statutes have never been 
thought to allow the State to show probability of guilt because of prior 
convictions.”47  Relatedly, Justice Warren observed, “[t]he fact of prior 
convictions is not intended by recidivist statutes to make it any easier 
for the State to prove the commission of a subsequent crime.”48  He 
38. McGuinness, supra note 16, at 113.
39. Id.
40. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 563–65 (1967).
41. McGuinness, supra note 16, at 113. “Chief Justice Warren and Justice Stewart both
agreed that the two-step trial method was ‘far superior’ to Texas’ method as a way to 
decrease potential prejudice.” Id. at 113 n.117. 
42. Spencer, 385 U.S. at 113.
43. Id. at 564.
44. Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
45. McGuinness, supra note 16, at 113–14.
46. Id. at 114 n.122.
47. Id. at 571 (Warren, C.J., dissenting and concurring).
48. Id.
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was in favor of striking statues like 1108 on pre-emption grounds, 
claiming that they would violate the Due Process Clause.49 
Whether or not a State has recidivist statutes on its books, it is well 
established that evidence of prior convictions may not be used by 
the State to show that the accused has a criminal disposition and 
that the probability that he committed the crime currently charged 
is increased.  While this Court has never held that the use of prior 
convictions to show nothing more than a disposition to commit 
crime would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, our decisions exercising supervisory power over 
criminal trials in federal courts, as well as decisions by courts of 
appeals and of state courts, suggest that evidence of prior crimes 
introduced for no purpose other than to show criminal disposition 
would violate the Due Process Clause.50  
 Justice Warren further elaborates that using previous crimes for 
propensity purposes sabotages the accused individual’s opportunity for 
a fair trial, and is thus unconstitutional.51 
Evidence of prior convictions has been forbidden because it 
jeopardizes the presumption of innocence of the crime currently 
charged.  A jury might punish an accused for being guilty of a 
previous offense, or feel that incarceration is justified because the 
accused is a ‘bad man,’ without regard to his guilt of the crime 
currently charged.  Of course it flouts human nature to suppose that 
a jury would not consider a defendant’s previous trouble with the 
law in deciding whether he has committed the crime currently 
charged against him.  As Justice Jackson put it in a famous phrase, 
“the naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by 
instructions to the jury…all practicing lawyers know to be 
unmitigated fiction.”52 
Justice Warren would presumably recoil at laws like section 1108; 
despite the claim by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that allowing 
the evidentiary admission of prior specific crimes to show propensity 
“is not a blank check entitling the government to introduce whatever 
evidence it wishes, no matter how minimally relevant and potentially 
devastating to the defendant.”53  The safeguards against this “blank 
check” are contingent on the court’s judgment call on the highly 
49. McGuinness, supra note 16, at 114.
50. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 572–74 (1967).
51. McGuinness, supra note 16, at 115.
52. Spencer, 385 U.S. at 575 (quoting Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453
(1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)). 
53. United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001) (considering the
public policy behind similar federal rules).  
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fraught topic of sex offenses, where even the most even-keeled judge 
may harbor knee-jerk reactions, not to mention the political pressures 
of reelection.  Justice Warren points out that this “apparently plausible 
syllogism”54 crumbles when the Court’s majority conclusion is not 
actually comprised of the two premises:55 
I believe the Court has fallen into the logical fallacy sometimes 
known as the fallacy of the undistributed middle, because it has 
failed to examine the supposedly shared principle between 
admission of prior crimes related to guilt and admission in 
connection with recidivist statutes. That the admission in both 
situations may serve a vast purpose does not demonstrate that the 
former practice justifies the latter any more than the fact that men 
and dogs are animals means that men and dogs are the same in all 
respects.56  
 Chief Justice Warren concluded his pointed dissent in Spencer 
by lamenting that the majority of his peers on the bench were focused 
on the recidivist statutes’ goals to the detriment of analyzing their 
constitutionality.57  Likewise, courts face the same risks with section 
1108.58  It is safe to surmise that judges want to convict sex offenders.59  
The constitutional propriety of seeking convictions via prior specific 
acts character evidence is less apparent.60  Since section 1108 character 
evidence eases the burden on the prosecution and irreparably harms 
any presumption of innocence,61 it creates an environment where an 
innocent person is more likely to be convicted.62 
Nevertheless, California Courts of Appeal have disavowed such 
concerns in cases like People v. Fitch, where the defendant in a rape 
trial challenged the use of section 1108 to admit evidence of his guilt in 
an earlier rape.63  The holding in Fitch limited the scope of the Due 
Process Cause to the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights, narrowly 
defining the category of judicial actions that violate fundamental 
fairness.64  In Fitch, California’s Third District Court of Appeal stated 
that admitting evidence of prior specific sex crimes does not offend 
“some principle of justice so rooted in traditions and conscience of 
54. McGuinness, supra note 16, at 115.
55. Id.
56. Spencer, 385 U.S. at 578–79 (Warren, C.J., dissenting and concurring).
57. Id. at 569–71.
58. McGuinness, supra note 16, at 116.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See Spencer 385 U.S. at 571, 575 (Warren, J., dissenting and concurring).
62. Id.
63. See People v. Fitch, 55 Cal. App. 4th 172, 175–76 (1997).
64. Id. at 178–79.
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people as to be ranked as fundamental.”65  Courts defend this reasoning 
by pointing out section 352’s balancing test as section 1108’s built-in 
safeguard against the use of uncharged sex offenses in cases where its 
admission could result in a fundamentally unfair trial.66 
SECTION 352 BALANCING: DOES IT REALLY PREVENT MISCARRIAGES 
OF JUSTICE?  
Ostensibly, Evidence Code section 352 serves as a prophylactic 
shield against the use of prior sex crimes under section 1108 if such 
evidence would potentiate an unduly compromised trial.67  Section 
1108 evidence is subject to exclusion under section 352’s balancing 
test,68 which evaluates the probative value of evidence to ensure that it 
will not be substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice.69  
The California Supreme Court dubs section 352 “a realistic safeguard” 
for the admission of sex offense evidence to show propensity.70  Rather 
than admit or exclude every sex offense, trial judges must consider a 
multiplicity of non-dispositive factors like nature, relevance, and 
possible remoteness in time, the certainty of the offense’s commission, 
whether it confuses, misleads, or distracts the jurors, its similarity to 
the charged offense, its likely prejudicial impact on the jurors, the 
burden on the defendant in defending against the uncharged offense, 
and if there are any less prejudicial alternatives to its outright 
admission, such as allowing some but not all of the  other sex offenses, 
or excluding irrelevant though inflammatory details surrounding the 
offense.71 
FEMINISTS AGAINST SECTION 1108 
 Even though section 1108 is supposed to help victims of sex 
crimes, some feminist scholars believe it actually subverts the advances 
made by rape shield laws for complainants in sex crimes.72  The 
rationale for this conclusion is that the need for propensity evidence 
facilitated by section 1108 reflects the attitude that a woman’s 
credibility is insufficient to sustain a criminal complaint.73  Further, 
65. Id. at 179.
66. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108(a) (West 2016).
67. People v. Chatman, 38 Cal. 4th 344 (2006) (citing CAL. EVID. CODE, § 352).
68. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108(a) (West 2016).
69. CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 2016).
70. People v. Falsetta, 21 Cal. 4th 903, 918 (1999).
71. Id. at 917.
72. McGuinness, supra note 16, at 98.
73. Id.
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section 1108 could compromise rape shield laws by making the sexual 
character of the defendant take center-stage, which would seem to 
make the sexual character of the victim more relevant by proxy.74 
 Enacted in the 1970s, sections 1103(c)75 and 78276 of the 
California Evidence Code are commonly known as rape shield laws.77  
The purpose of rape shields was to combat the societal tendency to 
victim-blame that can infiltrate juror consciousness, particularly when 
the victim may not adhere to normative standards of sexual virtue.78  
Rape shield laws also contradict laws requiring corroboration of rape 
accusations, because the latter convey that without a third party 
vouching for her story, we cannot trust that a woman is telling the 
74. See id.
75. CAL. EVID. CODE  § 1103(c)(1)-(6) (West 2016):
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this code to the contrary, and except as
provided in this subdivision, in any prosecution under Section 261, 262, or 264.1 of the 
Penal Code, or under Section 286, 288a, or 289 of the Penal Code, or for assault with intent 
to commit, attempt to commit, or conspiracy to commit a crime defined in any of those 
sections, except where the crime is alleged to have occurred in a local detention facility, as 
defined in Section 6031.4, or in a state prison, as defined in Section 4504, opinion evidence, 
reputation evidence, and evidence of specific instances of the complaining witness' sexual 
conduct, or any of that evidence, is not admissible by the defendant in order to prove 
consent by the complaining witness. 
(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (3), evidence of the manner in which the victim was
dressed at the time of the commission of the offense shall not be admissible when offered by 
either party on the issue of consent in any prosecution for an offense specified in paragraph 
(1), unless the evidence is determined by the court to be relevant and admissible in the 
interests of justice.  The proponent of the evidence shall make an offer of proof outside the 
hearing of the jury.  The court shall then make its determination and at that time, state the 
reasons for its ruling on the record. For the purposes of this paragraph, “manner of dress” 
does not include the condition of the victim's clothing before, during, or after the 
commission of the offense. 
(3) Paragraph (1) shall not be applicable to evidence of the complaining witness' sexual
conduct with the defendant. 
(4) If the prosecutor introduces evidence, including testimony of a witness, or the
complaining witness as a witness gives testimony, and that evidence or testimony relates to 
the complaining witness' sexual conduct, the defendant may cross-examine the witness who 
gives the testimony and offer relevant evidence limited specifically to the rebuttal of the 
evidence introduced by the prosecutor or given by the complaining witness. 
(5) Nothing in this subdivision shall be construed to make inadmissible any evidence
offered to attack the credibility of the complaining witness as provided in Section 782. 
(6) As used in this section, “complaining witness” means the alleged victim of the
crime charged, the prosecution of which is subject to this subdivision. 
76. This section of the law says that it may be permissible to introduce evidence about
the accuser's sexual past that is used to challenge the accuser's credibility. CAL. EVID. CODE 
§ 782 (West 2016).
77. Harriet R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A
Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 765 (1986); see also Peter M. 
Hazelton, Rape Shield Laws: Limits on Zealous Advocacy, 19 AM. J. CRIM. L. 35, 36 (1991).  
78. Hazelton, supra note 77, at 36–37.
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truth.79 “This justification maintains that a woman is likely to make 
false rape charges from shame or to protect her reputation after having 
consensual sex; to shield another man who has made her pregnant; 
from hatred; for blackmail; or for simple notoriety.”80  Further, in the 
1970s, mainstream psychiatrists attributed false rape allegations “to the 
fact that for some women it is better to be raped than ignored.”81 
 Although the corroboration requirement is now defunct, its 
legacy “casts a shadow, in that the law still suggests that rape cases and 
rape complainants occupy a separate category when it comes to 
credibility.”82  Attorney and feminist scholar Susan Estrich asserts that 
the corroboration requirement emerged in “response to a man’s 
nightmarish fantasy of being charged with simple rape” and the 
“institutionalization of the law’s distrust of women victims through 
rules of evidence and procedure.”83  
 Accordingly, feminist legal scholars assert that section 1108 has 
revitalized this notion that a women’s testimony cannot be relied upon 
to convict on its own.84  This notion is reinforced by Senator Rogan in 
the Public Safety Report: “Evidence that a particular defendant has 
such a propensity (to commit sexual offenses) is especially probative 
and should be considered by the trier of fact when determining 
credibility of a victim’s testimony.”85  Therefore, one of the purposes 
of section 1108 appears to be the admission of evidence concerning the 
probability that the defendant has been falsely or mistakenly implicated 
in commission of the charged offense, based on the defendant’s 
history.86  The focus is not the defendant’s guilt as much as bolstering 
or corroborating the woman’s credibility.87  
 Scholars suggest the admission of defendant’s propensity 
evidence is unique to sex crimes because “in no other crime is the 
victim’s testimony automatically suspect.”88  As such, “section 1108 
79. See Donald J. Friedman, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not
Reform, 81 YALE L.J. 1365, 1367–70 (1972).  Since the 1970s, rape corroboration laws have 
since become defunct.  McGuinness, supra note 16, at 107. 
80. Id.
81. Friedman, supra note 79, at 1373 n.60.
82. Rosemary C. Hunter, Gender in Evidence: Masculine Norms vs. Feminist Reforms,
19 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 127, 156 (1996). 
83. Lisa R. Eskow, The Ultimate Weapon? Demythologizing Spousal Rape and
Reconceptualizing its Prosecution, 48 STAN. L. REV. 677, 694–95 (1996). 
84. McGuinness, supra note 16, at 107.
85. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMM. REP., A.B. 882, 1995-96 Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 1995). 
86. Id.
87. McGuinness, supra note 16, at 108.
88. Id. at 108.
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revives the corroboration requirement through the back door.  It 
perpetuates the myth that the victim’s credibility in sex cases is 
categorically suspect.”89    
Designed to protect the “categorically suspect” victim, rape shield 
laws like California Evidence Code section 1103(c) disallow evidence 
of prior sexual conduct to prove that the alleged victim consented.90  
Section 782 requires a signed document attesting to the relevance of 
the evidence and a private relevancy hearing without the jury present 
before any evidence of the complainant’s prior sexual conduct can 
come into evidence.91  And even with sworn proof of relevancy, section 
782 evidence can be excluded if the court finds it more prejudicial than 
probative.92  Further, the relevant evidence must pertain to credibility 
rather than consent: “Great care must be taken to insure that this 
exception to the general rule barring evidence of a complaining 
witness' prior sexual conduct . . . does not impermissibly encroach 
upon the rule itself and become a ‘back door’ for admitting otherwise 
inadmissible evidence.”93  Thus, when rape shield laws emerged in the 
1970s, neither the defense nor the prosecution could use each other’s 
respective sexual character against one-another.94  When section 1108 
was enacted in 1995, it tipped the sexual character balance scale out of 
equilibrium, since the prosecution is now allowed to use evidence of 
prior sex crimes to show the defendant’s propensity to commit the 
charged sex crime.95  This is not to suggest that our society and our 
legal system should not concern itself with sex crime recidivism, but to 
illustrate the discrepancy between the evidence allowed in sex crimes 
via section 1108 and similar laws and the admissible evidence for all 
other violent crimes, which are generally subject to the restrictions on 
evidence of prior specific acts to show propensity.96  
THE SCIENCE AND MYTHOLOGY OF RECIDIVISM 
 California’s Supreme Court acknowledges that section 1108 is 
intended to allow justices to consider the propensity of the defendant to 
89. Id.
90. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1103(c)(1) (West 2016).  This prohibition applies to conduct
with people other than the defendant; conduct with the defendant remains admissible under 
section 1103(c)(3). 
91. CAL. EVID. CODE § 782 (West 2016).
92. People v. Rioz, 161 Cal. App. 3d 905, 916 (1984).
93. Id. at 918–19.
94. McGuinness, supra note 16, at 102.
95. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108 (West 2016); see also McGuinness, supra note 16, at 102.
96. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101 (West 2016).
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commit sex crimes.97  Section 1108 is predicated on the notion that “the 
propensity to commit sexual offenses is not a common attribute among 
the general public. Therefore evidence that a particular defendant has 
such a propensity is especially probative.”98  However, at least one 
analysis has found no definitive proof that prior bad acts are probative 
of guilt in the current offense.99  
Nevertheless, sexual character evidence may be a focus for many 
jurors, and defendants may be convicted on this basis even when the 
evidence would not otherwise merit a conviction.100  This is 
particularly acute when the prior act was particularly reprehensible but 
related only to the trial in that it was sexual.  And the justification for 
section 1108—that prior crimes evidence is probative—is not a 
conclusion consistent with the results of some recidivism studies.101  
One study from the Bureau of Justice compared recidivism across the 
criminal spectrum and found that the recidivism rate for rape was 
7.7%, compared to 31.9% for burglars and 19.6% for violent 
robbers.102  Only homicide has a lower recidivism rate.103  These 
statistics directly contradict the section 1108 proponents who believe 
that prior sex crimes are probative of future guilt.  
 Further, there is evidence of some variation in recidivism rates 
within the sex crime category itself104 and within different categories of 
perpetrators within a given crime.105  For example, true pedophiles, 
who have an exclusive sexual propensity towards children,106 are sure 
to have much higher child sexual abuse recidivism rates in general than 
situational child molesters, who do not necessarily prefer children: 
“pedophilia [is] a mental abnormality that critically involves what a lay 
person might describe as a lack of control.  DSM-IV 571-572 (listing 
as a diagnostic criterion for pedophilia that an individual have acted on, 
or been affected by, “sexual urges” toward children).”107  In the 1997 
97. People v. Falsetta, 21 Cal. 4th 903, 907 (1999).
98. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMM. REP., A.B. 882, 1995-96 Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 1995) (statement of Assemblyman James Rogan, author of A.B. 882). 
99. McGuinness, supra note 16, at 109.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, "Other Crimes" Evidence in Sex Offense
Cases, 78 MINN. L. REV. 529, 572 n.182 (1994).  
103.  See id.
104. Keith Soothill, Sex Offender Recidivism, 39 CRIME & JUST. 145, 156–61, 203
(2010); see, e.g., R.K. HANSON & M.T. BUSSIERE, (1998). Predicting Relapse: A Meta-
Analysis of Sexual Offender Recidivism Studies, 63 J. CONSULTING CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 
348-62 (1998) (evaluating and comparing types of sexual offenses and recidivism rates).
105. Id. at 156–61.
106. See id.; see also Hanson & Bussiere, supra note 104, at 348-62.
107. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 414 (2002).
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Supreme Court case Kansas v. Hendricks, the Court described how the 
defendant personifies the preferential child molester’s high risk for 
recidivism: the defendant conceded that, “when he becomes ‘stressed 
out,’ he cannot ‘control the urge’ to molest children.”108  The Court 
goes on to discuss Hendricks' diagnosis as a pedophile, "which 
qualifies as a “mental abnormality”: “[t]his admitted lack of volitional 
control, coupled with a prediction of future dangerousness, adequately 
distinguishes Hendricks from other dangerous persons . . .”109  Cases 
like Hendricks’ exemplify how certain types of sex crimes have a 
heavy, but not exclusive, overlap with medical psychopathy like 
pedophilia or sexual sadism.  However, detailed studies show that “sex 
offenders referred for psychiatric assessment or treatment cannot be 
considered as representative of all sex offenders.”110  Thus section 1108 
paints all sex offenders with the broad brush of propensity when only 
certain, relatively defined subsets within the category show a markedly 
higher risk of recidivism.  If a defendant is not within one of those 
high-risk groups, it is much more likely that section 1108 would bring 
into evidence information that would weigh heavy on the jury without 
substantiation of its probative value.  In addition to the heightened 
propensity for recidivism of the preferential sex offender, the age of the 
offender is another measurable variable that directly correlates to 
repeat offenses.111  Thus the admission of a young defendant’s previous 
sex offense under California Evidence Code section 1108 would be 
more probative of present guilt than it would of a much older 
defendant, particularly if the past incident was distant in time from the 
present charge.  From extensive data and meta-analysis, “the 
understanding is that there is an inverse relationship between sexual 
offenders’ age at the time of their release from incarceration and their 
sexual recidivism risk.”112 
REMEDIES 
Non-Character Compromises: How About Habit? 
 Section 1108 is an unnecessary tool.  There is no per se ban on 
admitting evidence of a defendant’s previous actions.113  Accordingly, 
even with section 1101’s ban on character evidence, prior sex crimes 
108. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360 (1997).
109. Id.
110. Soothill, supra note 104, at 158.
111. Id. at 163–64.
112. Id. at 164.
113. Cammack, supra note 5, at 360.
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can theoretically come into evidence as long as they are admitted for 
non-propensity purposes.114  The constitutional ambiguities of section 
1108’s exception to the ban on character evidence could be avoided if 
section 1108 was supplanted by pre-existing mechanisms for admitting 
the same types of evidence.  For example, before section 1108 and its 
federal counterpart’s delineated exceptions to the ban on character 
evidence, courts in sex crime trials admitted evidence of the 
defendant’s prior acts “to show a passion or propensity for unusual and 
abnormal sexual relations.”115  In other words, courts could admit 
evidence that past criminal perversions were habitual and thus 
admissible under California Evidence Code section 1105.116  As such, 
habit evidence could replace section 1108 as a more precise means to 
admit prior bad acts that would seem more conducive to due process, 
since the offenses would have to closely parallel the instant case in 
order to show a habit.117 
The difference between character and habit can be described as 
follows:  
Character is a generalized description of a person's disposition, or 
of the disposition in respect to a general trait, such as honesty, 
temperance or peacefulness.  Habit, in the present context, is more 
specific.  It denotes one's regular response to a repeated situation. 
If we speak of a character for care, we think of the person's 
tendency to act prudently in all the varying situations of life—in 
business, at home, in handling automobiles and in walking across 
the street.  A habit, on the other hand, is the person's regular 
practice of responding to a particular kind of situation with a 
specific type of conduct.  Thus, a person may be in the habit of 
bounding down a certain stairway two or three steps at a time, of 
patronizing a particular pub after each day's work, or of driving his 
automobile without using a seatbelt.  The doing of the habitual act 
may become semi-automatic.118  
Accordingly, habit evidence is considered more reliable than 
character evidence.119  The relative precision of habit is oppositional to 
the breadth of section 1108, where a rape of a middle-aged woman ten 
years before the trial could potentially come as character evidence in a 
114. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1995).
115. 1 McCormick § 162 (1952).
116. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1105 (West 2016): Any otherwise admissible evidence of habit
or custom is admissible to prove conduct on a specified occasion in conformity with the 
habit or custom. 
117. Id.
118. 1 McCormick § 195 at 574–75.
119. See FED. R. EVID. 406 advisory committee’s note.
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child molestation case.  
Perhaps a Plan to Prevent Prejudice? 
In addition to replacing section 1108’s propensity evidence with 
the more tailored section 1105 habit evidence, there are other non-
character mechanisms that are better tailored to the fair admission past 
misconduct.  One common example is to admit past acts for the non-
character purpose of showing a plan or design.120  Evidence of prior 
similar acts can be admitted under plan or design if it is probative of 
case specifics:121 “the number of events must be shown to be 
significantly more numerous than would be expected in the absence of 
design.”122  Further, the defendant’s uncharged misconduct and the 
charged offense are sufficiently similar to support the inference that 
they are manifestations of a common design or plan.”123  Here, the 
jurors are not being asked to conclude that the defendant acted in a 
particular manner because of the defendant’s inherent nature towards a 
certain kind of criminality.124  Rather, they are instructed to draw 
conclusions from an existing plan that would include acts both charged 
and uncharged.125  Unlike section 1108’s showing of character or 
propensity for sexual criminality, evidence showing plan would seem 
more focused and material:  
It is reasonable to infer from evidence showing that the defendant 
has committed a series of similar crimes that she has settled on a single 
technique for committing that crime, either because she has had 
success with the technique or because using the same technique will 
economize on imaginative effort.126 
 Although evidentiary use of prior bad acts by a defendant is 
undoubtedly unfavorable to the accused, the non-character means of 
admission are more focused and precise, and their utilization instead of 
section 1108 would reduce the prosecutorial free-for-all that skirts the 
limits of due process.127    
Sever the Shield 
More controversially, remedying the disparity in reciprocity 
120. For commonly recognized non-character uses of uncharged misconduct evidence,
see 1 McCormick § 190. 
121. Cammack, supra note 5, at 362.
122. Id. at 389.
123. People v. Ewoldt, 7 Cal. 4th 380, 401–02 (1994).
124. Cammack, supra note 5, at 362.
125. Id.
126. Cammack, supra note 5, at 372.
127. Id.
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may mediate the disparate prejudice wrought by propensity evidence 
against the defendant.128  In other words, if the defendant can have past 
uncharged sexual behavior and misconduct used against him, perhaps 
the “rape shield”129 should be lifted off of the complaining witnesses.130  
Reciprocity in “digging up dirt” on the sexual predilections of both the 
complaining witness and accused would seem more congruent to 
standards of judicial balance.131  In Wardius v. Oregon,132 the United 
States Supreme Court recognized the right to reciprocity was built into 
due process: to “speak to the balance of forces between the accused and 
his accuser.”133 
The reciprocity requirement allows the defendant to enjoy rights 
equivalent to the prosecution in regards to the presentation of 
evidence.134  When a defendant is subject to character evidence under 
section 1108, justifying the exclusions of rape shield statutes because 
of governmental interest in protecting a complainant's privacy 
unreasonably disadvantages the defense.135  Privacy should not 
outweigh  the due process or the interests of justice in admitting 
relevant evidence.136  The California Constitution does guarentee a 
right of privacy; however, the interest in due process for one accused 
should still outweigh a constitutional guarentee.  That the defendant 
stands to lose so much should preclide shutting the door to helpful and 
possibly exculpatory information.  
 Reciprocity should also apply to the usage of character 
evidence.137  In People v. Hansel, the California Supreme Court stated 
that required reciprocal pretrial discovery helps defendants to present 
their defense.138  Keeping in line with the precedent of reciprocity from 
of Hansel and Wardius, section 1108 should theoretically open the 
door to defense attorneys seeking to introduce a complainant's sexual 
history.139 
128. See McGuinness, supra note 16, at 118.
129. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 782 (West 2016).
130. See McGuinness, supra note 16, at 119.
131. David Haxton, Comment, Rape Shield Statutes: Constitutional Despite
Unconstitutional Exclusions of Evidence, WIS. L. REV. 1219, 1256 (1985).  
132. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973).
133. Id. at 474.
134. McGuinness, supra note 16, at 118.
135. Id. at 119.
136. Haxton, supra note 131, at 1259.
137. McGuinness, supra note 16, at 119.
138. People v. Hansel, 1 Cal. 4th 1211, 1221 (1992).
139. McGuinness, supra note 16, at 119.
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CONCLUSION 
Section 1108 will lead to injustice for someone—the question is 
whether it “will [] be women or the accused?”140  It seems like there are 
only two viable options to bring due process back to equilibrium: either 
cease the admission of propensity evidence to secure the conviction of 
sex offenders, or relinquish rape shield laws, making women less 
secure, but assuring that the scales of justice are more evenly 
weighted.141 
140. Id.
141. Id.
